Method for managing content on a secure element connected to an equipment

ABSTRACT

The invention concerns a method for managing content on a secure element connected to an equipment, this content being managed on the secure element from a distant administrative platform. According to the invention, the method consists in: establishing, at the level of the administrative platform a secure channel between the equipment and the administrative platform, thanks to session keys generated by the secure element and transmitted to the equipment; transmitting to the administrative platform a request to manage content of the secure element; and verifying at the level of the administrative platform that this request originates from the same secure element that has generated the session keys and, if positive, authorizing the management and, if negative, forbid this management.

This disclosure is a national phase of PCT/EP2011/071781, acontinuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 13/312,309, filed Dec.6, 2011, and claims priority of European Application No. 10306359.0,filed Dec. 6, 2010, the disclosures of which are hereby incorporated byreference.

The present invention concerns a method for managing content on a secureelement connected to an equipment.

A secure element is typically a UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card)embedding a Sim application, this secure element being installed,fixedly or not, in a terminal, like for example a mobile phone or amachine (for M2M (Machine to Machine) applications).

A UICC can be in the format of a smart card, or may be in any otherformat such as for example but not limited to a packaged chip asdescribed in PCT/SE2008/050380, or any other format. It can be used inmobile terminals in GSM and UMTS networks for instance. The UICC ensuresnetwork authentication, integrity and security of all kinds of personaldata.

In a GSM network, the UICC contains mainly a SIM application and in aUMTS network it is the USIM application. A UICC may contain severalother applications, making it possible for the same smart card to giveaccess to both GSM and UMTS networks, and also provide storage of aphone book and other applications. It is also possible to access a GSMnetwork using an USIM application and it is possible to access UMTSnetworks using a SIM application with mobile terminals prepared forthis. With the UMTS release 5 and later stage network like LTE, a newapplication, the IP multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) isrequired for services in the IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem). Thetelephone book is a separate application and not part of eithersubscription information module.

In a CDMA network, the UICC contains a CSIM application, in addition to3GPP USIM and SIM applications. A card with all three features is calleda removable user identity card, or R-UIM. Thus, the R-UIM card can beinserted into CDMA, GSM, or UMTS handsets, and will work in all threecases.

In 2G networks, the SIM card and SIM application were bound together, sothat “SIM card” could mean the physical card, or any physical card withthe SIM application.

The UICC smart card consists of a CPU, ROM, RAM, EEPROM and I/Ocircuits. Early versions consisted of the whole full-size (85×54 mm,ISO/IEC 7810 ID-1) smart card.

Since the card slot is standardized, a subscriber can easily move theirwireless account and phone number from one handset to another. This willalso transfer their phone book and text messages. Similarly, usually asubscriber can change carriers by inserting a new carrier's UICC cardinto their existing handset. However, it is not always possible becausesome carriers (e.g. in U.S.) SIM-LOCK the phones that they sell, thuspreventing competitor carriers' cards being used.

The integration of the ETSI framework and the Application managementframework of Global Platform is standardized in the UICC configuration.

UICCs are standardized by 3GPP and ETSI.

A UICC can normally be removed from a mobile terminal, for example whenthe user wants to change his mobile terminal. After having inserted hisUICC in his new terminal, the user will still have access to hisapplications, contacts and credentials (network operator).

It is also known to solder or weld the UICC in a terminal, in order toget it dependent of this terminal. This is done in M2M (Machine toMachine) applications. The same objective is reached when a chip (asecure element) containing the SIM or USIM applications and files iscontained in the terminal. The chip is for example soldered to themother-board of the terminal or machine and constitutes an e-UICC.

Some of the known solutions apply to such soldered e-UICCs or to suchchips containing the same applications than the chips comprised inUICCs. A parallel can be done for UICCs that are not totally linked todevices but that are removable with difficulty because they are notintended to be removed, located in terminals that are distant or deeplyintegrated in machines. A special form factor of the UICC (very smallfor example and therefore not easy to handle) can also be a reason toconsider it as in fact integrated in a terminal. The same applies when aUICC is integrated in a machine that is not intended to be opened.

In the next description, welded UICCs or chips containing or designed tocontain the same applications than UICCs will generally be calledembedded UICCs or embedded secure elements (in contrast to removableUICCs or removable secure elements). This will also apply to UICCs orsecure elements that are removable with difficulty.

The invention relates to the remote management of a secure element likea UICC located on or in a device that can be infected by a malware. Thisinvention applies to embedded UICCs (e-UICCs) and to removable UICCs.The term “secure element” will be used generally in the followingdescription for designating such an UICC.

It is known that, once issued, the secure element needs to be maintainedduring its whole life. The maintenance usually consists in remote updateof the secure element content. It could be a late stage personalization,a code patch, installation of a new functionality, data update, keyrenewal, etc. These operations are performed by a remote administrationplatform that operates through a potentially unsecured network (e.g. theInternet) and a potentially unsecured device to which the secure elementis attached.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a system comprising a terminal andremote administrative platform;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a system that further includes ahacker's terminal; and

FIGS. 3 and 4 are schematic diagrams that depicts improvements to thesystem in accordance with the principles of the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1 represents a system where a secure element comprised in aterminal 21 downloads content from an administrative platform 22 overthe Internet 23. Malware 24 can be present at the level of Internet 23or malware 25 at the level of the terminal 21.

In order to secure the process, there is usually an end-to-end securecommunication protocol between the administration platform and thesecure element (e.g. one Global Platform protocol). However, in mostcases, neither the server nor the secure element has a directconnectivity to each other and there is some middleware on the devicethat initiate the secure administration session. It is well known thatthis first session between the middleware and the server has to besecured as well (e.g. with TLS) for multiple reasons (authentication ofremote management request, confidentiality of the request, avoidingdenial of service, etc.).

However, if some malware is located on a terminal, it can be used by ahacker to perform some remote management on its secure element on behalfof the victim's device on which the malware is sitting as depicted inFIG. 2.

In this figure, the malware 25 is located in victim's terminal 21. Evenif the channel between the terminal 21 and the administrative platform22 is secured through TLS, the malware 25 can direct the content (dataand software) to another secure element 26 located in a hacker'sterminal 27 through the Internet 23. This redirection of the downloadedcontent can be very harmful for the owner of terminal 21. For example,in the Telecom domain, it can be foreseen to download an entire SIMapplication on an existing secure element like 20. For that, the user ofterminal 21 connects to the administrative platform 22 through theInternet and asks for a subscription to a given MNO (the administrativeplatform can be connected to different MNOs as it will be seen later).Platform 22 recognises user's terminal 21 and after this identification,prepares the content to be downloaded (Sim application, data,credentiels among them IMSI and Ki). If the content is loaded on thesecure element 26 of the hacker instead on the secure element 20, theowner of terminal 21 will not only not be able to connect to this MNO'snetwork but he will pay for the hacker's communications.

In addition, the credential used to authenticate the device can bestolen by the malware.

Using the secure element as is to authenticate the device is alsodifficult for two reasons. Firstly the secure element is undermanagement so it is difficult to use it (especially if it is notpersonalized or if its personalization is not finished). Secondly, thecredential it contains may belong to another entity which is not the oneoperating the remote management platform.

The present invention proposes a solution to these problems.

In this respect, the present invention concerns a method for managingcontent on a secure element connected to an equipment, the content beingmanaged on the secure element from a distant administrative platform,the method consisting in:

-   -   Establishing, at the level of the administrative platform a        secure channel between the equipment and the administrative        platform, thanks to session keys generated by the secure element        and transmitted to the equipment;    -   Transmitting to the administrative platform a request to manage        content of the secure element;    -   Verifying at the level of the administrative platform that the        request originates from the same secure element that has        generated the session keys and, if positive, authorizing the        management and, if negative, forbid the management.

The aforementioned management consists in at least one of the followingtasks:

-   -   Downloading content on the secure element    -   Deleting content on the secure element    -   Exporting content stored on the secure element    -   Activating content stored on the secure element    -   Deactivating content stored on the secure element

The verification can consist in verifying that the private key used forestablishing the secure channel corresponds to a certificate deliveredto the secure element on which the management is requested.

In another embodiment, the verification consists in verifying that anidentifier corresponding to a symmetrical key used for establishing thesecure channel corresponds to an identifier of the secure element onwhich the management is requested.

The present improvement will be better understood by reading thefollowing description of the FIGS. 3 and 4 where:

-   -   FIG. 3 represents a first step of the method of the present        improvement;    -   FIG. 4 represents a second step of the method of the present        improvement.

The invention proposes to insert in the secure element an independentapplication which is used to secure the session between theadministrative platform and the terminal. After this step, the serververifies the binding between the identity at the device session leveland the identity at the secure element remote management.

FIG. 3 represents a first step of the method of the present invention.

As can be seen, the secure element 20 comprises an application 28foreseen to provide session keys to the administrative platform 22.These session keys are generated by the application 28 and transmittedto the equipment 21. The application 28 transmits also an identifier ora certificate to the equipment 21:

-   -   An identifier is sent from the application 28 to the equipment        when a symmetrical encryption is used (on the basis of secret        keys) for creating a secure channel between the platform 22 and        the equipment 21. The equipment 21 transmits this identifier to        the platform 22. The platform 22 then compares the received        identifier with identifiers it stores, in order to recognize        which application sent the identifier. Once recognized, the        platform 22 associates a symmetrical key to the identifier of        the application 28. The application 28 and the platform 22 then        derive session keys in order to encrypt (for confidentiality        reasons) and maintain the integrity of the communication between        the equipment 21 and the platform 22. A secure channel has thus        been established between the equipment 21 and the platform 22        (examples of such protocols are standardized by Global Platform,        PSK-TLS can also be used).    -   Another way to create this secure channel consists in exchanging        certificates between the platform 22 and the application 28. The        platform authenticates the application 28 by asking it to sign a        hash of all the messages already exchanged. The equipment 21        generates a session key and encrypts it for the platform 22. A        secured communication (one example of such a standardized is        TLS) is then established between the equipment 21 and the        platform 22.

In both of the preceding cases a secure channel has been establishedbetween the platform and the equipment 21.

The main second step of the invention consists in verifying the bindingbetween the identity at the device session level and the identity at thesecure element remote management.

FIG. 4 represents this step.

A request to manage content of the secure element is sent to theadministrative platform. This management consists for example indownloading content on the secure element 20, deleting or exportingcontent stored on it or activating or deactivating content stored on it.The download of content can for example consist in downloading an entireSim application on the secure element, with the associated credentials(IMSI, Ki). It can also consist in downloading a phone book in thesecure element 20 from the platform 22.

In order to verify this binding, the secure element 20 sends through theestablished secure channel a fixed identifier, like for example hisICCID or his serial number. The platform 22 verifies that this requestoriginates from the same secure element (for example the session keysused for establishing the secure channel are compared to the fixedidentifier). If the check is positive, the management is authorized. Onthe contrary, if the check is negative, the management is forbidden.

The invention ensures that the secure element that is managed is thecorrect one and not another secure element linked to the platform by amalware.

The equipment 21 can be mobile or fixed, for example constituted by amachine.

1. A method for managing content on a secure element connected to anequipment, said content being managed on said secure element from aremote administrative platform, wherein said method comprises:establishing, at the level of said administrative platform a securechannel between said equipment and said administrative platform, usingsession keys generated by said secure element and transmitted to saidequipment; transmitting to said administrative platform a request tomanage content of said secure element; and verifying at the level ofsaid administrative platform that said request originates from the samesecure element that has generated said session keys and, if positive,authorizing said management and, if negative, forbid said management. 2.A method according to claim 1, wherein said management comprises in atleast one of the following tasks: downloading content on said secureelement deleting content on said secure element; exporting contentstored on said secure element; activating content stored on said secureelement; and deactivating content stored on said secure element
 3. Amethod according to claim 1, wherein said verification comprises inverifying that a private key used for establishing said secure channelcorresponds to a certificate delivered to the secure element on whichthe management is requested.
 4. A method according to claim 1, whereinsaid verification comprises in verifying that an identifiercorresponding to a symmetrical key used for establishing said securechannel corresponds to an identifier of the secure element on which themanagement is requested.
 5. A method according to claim 1, wherein saidequipment is a mobile equipment.
 6. A method according to claim 1,wherein said equipment is a fixed equipment.